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John Maynard Keynes's vision of the problems and prospects  of 
capitalism,  though at times voiced in terms of the distribution  of 
income  or  wealth  among  different  classes  of  income  recipients 
(e.g., Keynes,  1971  [1923], Chap.  1; 1971  [1930], Book  III), was 
not  largely  concerned  with  class  conflict.  To  the  extent  that 
Keynes  did  see  problems  in  or  caused  by  the  inequalities  of 
distribution,  he  felt that the reforms which  could  be undertaken 
on  the  argument  of  his  General  Theory  would  take  care  of  these 
problems  easily  enough  within  the  existing  institutions  of 
capitalism  and  without  calling  for any  serious  expropriation  of 
property.  To be sure, his support for progressive  income taxation 
to  increase  the propensity  to consume  and  for low interest  rates 
and  Ita  somewhat  comprehensive  socialization  of  investment"  to 
provide  sufficient  investment 
the  rentier,"  (Keynes,  1964 
threatening  to some. 
and bring  about  the  "euthanasia  of 
[1936],  Chap.  24)  have  appeared 
Michal Kalecki's version of the theory of effective demand was 
cast  in  a  two-class  model  of  accumulation  and  distribution. 
Economists  with  a  relation  to  the  Marxian  tradition,  such  as 
Kalecki  or Paul  Sweezy, who  accepted  the  importance  of effective 
demand, have also held that full employment  and/or redistributive 
policies  threaten  capital  and that capital  will  fight back.  (See 
Kalecki, 1971 [1943], Chap. 12, and Sweezy, 1970 [1942], Chap. 19.) 
In Kalecki's  models,  however,  the class  conflict  on one  level  is 
severely attenuated in that wages and profits are not strictly, nor 2 
even very much at all actually,  inversely related to one another. 
(See Kalecki,  1971, Chap. 14.) 
This paper  seeks to explore  this  issue of the existence  and 
nature of class conflict within a picture of the economy that could 
be called Kaleckian-Keynesian.  Though the particular model we will 
use owes  somewhat  more  to Kalecki  than Keynes,  it hopefully  does 
not violate  the spirit of Keynes very much, and in fact it relies 
rather heavily  on Keynes's  appreciation  of the rentier  aspect  of 
capitalism,  a matter  not discussed much by Kalecki.  In addition, 
combining the ideas of Kalecki and Keynes we will find leads us to 
insights beyond what each saw by himself. 
Most models of class conflict in a capitalist economy identify 
the  struggle  over  wages  v.  profits  as  the  conflict.  Adam 
Przeworski  and  Michael  Wallerstein  (1982b)  have  argued  that 
Keynesianism  denied the necessity of class conflict,  at least when 
the economy  is operating below full employment.  They then analyze 
(Przeworski  and Wallerstein,  1982a,  1988) the  structure  of class 
conflict  between  wage-earners  and  profit-earners  without  any 
consideration  for  the  problem  of  effective  demand,  presumably 
because  class  conflict  emerges  again  once  the  lVKeynesianV1 
underemployment  problem is no longer the issue. (See  Przeworski and 
Wallerstein,  1982b, pp. 58-60.)  The fact that class conflict may 
be  different  at v.  below  full  employment,  however,  doesn't  mean 
that  one  can  ignore  effective  demand  and  similar  "KeynesianI' 
considerations  simply because  one is starting  at full employment. 
Samuel  Bowles,  David Gordon,  and Thomas  Weisskopf  (1989) in a discussion  of the effects of the conservative  ascendancy  in the 
U.S. since 1979 show that even if one is considering  the issue of 
3 
profits v. wages, one has to examine the effects of redistributive 
policies  with  some regard  for their  effects  on overall  demand  as 
well as one group v. the other.  Bowles, Gordon,  and Weisskopf  in 
fact show that the conservative  agenda did damage to both profits 
and wages.  Their argument,  however,  assumes that the damage done 
to profits was done  in order to damage wages  in the inter;?st.of  a 
longer-tern  turnaround  in  profitability.  This  may  be  so,  but 
perhaps  this  was  not  really  what  the  game  was  about.  The 
Kaleckian-Keynesian  model by emphasizing the rentier aspect of the 
capitalist  economy  may  make  the  strategies  of  the  past  several 
years appear in a different  light.  After all, we know that though 
industry was hit along with labor, finance has done rather well.1 
I hope this analysis then will shed new light on the economic 
and  political  problems  of  liberal  and  social  democracy  in  the 
postwar  years as the effort to carry out the Keynesian  program  of 
full employment  and redistribution  came to grief.  We will  close 
the  paper  with  a  discussion  of 
possible  reforms  of the Keynesian 
A Kaleckian-Keynesian  Model 
the  prospects  and  problems  of 
program. 
The model is a variation on and extension of a model of Donald 
Harris  (1974).  Similar  models  have  been  constructed  by  A. 
'Bowles, Gordon,  and Weisskopf  (1989,.p.  130) do allow  that  . 
perhaps  the  regressive  redistribution  of  income  and  wealth  that 
occurred  in this period was what the game was all about. 4 
Asimakopulos  (1975) and G.C. Harcourt  (1972, pp. 210-214).  We have 













pY = w + l-I. 
w = WL. 
L = bY. 
p1 = s,rI  + s,w. 
-- 
p = @wb. 
p1 = p1, + an,. 
IIE  = II  - ;D. 
R = ;D + G. 
s, > SW. 
s, > a. 
3 > 1. 
PI0 > a;D. 
Even though we will want to discuss the relation of the state 
to the economy, we will be able to abstract  from an explicit  state 
sector for reasons that will become more apparent below.  Equation 
(1) thus  provides  that  the  aggregate  price  level,  p,  times  real 
national  income,  Y,  equals  the  aggregate  wage  bill,  W,  plus 
aggregate money profits,  II. Equation  (2) separates  the wage bill 
into the money  wage,  w,  times  the  level  of employment,  L.  L  in 
turn  is determined  in equation  (3) by b, the ratio  of employment 
to  national  income  or  output,  times  Y.  Equation  (4) gives  the 
Keynesian  saving-investment  macroeconomic  equilibrium,  wherein 
aggregate  demand  determines  aggregate  supply,  or  investment determines  saving  by  changing  the  level  and  distribution 




price  level times the level of real investment  spending,  I, equal 
to the propensity  to save out of profits,  s,,  times money profits, 
plus the propensity  to save out of wages, sW,  times the wage bill. 
Equation  (5) tells  us that  the price  level  is determined  by  the 
mark-up,  5, times the index of labor cost, wb, as we are assuming 
a fully integrated economy, so that labor is the only non-p‘roduced 
input.  Equation  (6) gives us our investment  function.  The level 
of nominal  investment  spending, p1, equals p times exogenous  real 
investment plus a linearly  increasing relation, given by a, to II~, 
"profit of enterprise,  I1  to use Karl Marx's term, which in equation 
(7) is seen to equal total money profits minus  interest  income, I 
times  outstanding  debt,  D.  Equation  (8) tells  us  that  rentier 
income, R, equals  interest  income plus capital gains, G. 
Inequality  (9)  provides  the  usual  assumption  that  the 
propensity  to save out of profits  exceeds  the propensity  to save 
out of wages, on the grounds, as you like, of profit-earners  on the 
whole  being  wealthier  than  wage-earners  or  of  a  large  part  of 
profits being  retained as saving by firms.  Inequality  (10) holds 
that the propensity  to save out of profits  exceeds  the  influence 
of  profits  (though not  strictly  the  propensity  to  spend  out  of 
profits) on investment.  This assumption is likely most of the time 
but  not  necessarily  so all of the time,  and we will  discuss  the 
effects  of  a  reversal  in  this  inequality  where  appropriate. 
Inequality  (11) simply  ensures  that we  have  less  than  VVperfectlU 6 
competition,  as  is  appropriate  in  a  Kaleckian  picture  of  the 
economy,  in  which  the  accumulation  of  more  than  llzerot'  or 
lNaccountingV'  profits in firms which may or may be not be reinvested 
is  important  to  the  story  of  effective  demand  determination  of 
economic  activity.  Finally,  as  can  be  seen  from  substituting 
equation  (7) into equation  (6), inequality  (12) states that nominal 
investment  spending  will  be  positive  even  if  profits  (or their 
influence  on  investment)  are  zero.  Since  we  are  talking  about 
gross investment, this is certainly plausible,  and it is necessary 
to ensure that national  income is always positive.' 
We take p, y, w, n, L, I, II,,  and R to be endogenous.  We thus 
have a short-period  model  for which equilibrium  quantities  of the 
endogenous  variables  can  be  solved  given  the  values  of  the 
exogenous  variables.  The short-period  (no change  in the  capital 
stock  within  the  period)  assumption  is  more  Keynesian  than 
Kaleckian.  Though adding Kaleckian dynamics,  involving  relations 
among  investment,  profits,  and the capital  stock,  3 is relevant  to 
our  concerns,  we  will  leave  it  for  an  extension  of  the  present 
work,  and we will use the method  of comparative  statics to tackle 
the question  of class conflict  in this paper. 
2  Actually  we  shall see that this  condition  will  also  ensure 
that total profits  are positive.  Profit  of enterprise  of course 
can be negative  to the extent that firms can absorb  losses out of 
prior accumulation  or by capitalizing  interest rather than having 
to declare bankruptcy. 
3Actually, relations  among investment,  profits,  and debt, as 
in  Hyman  Minsky  (1975,  1977)  would  be  more  straightforward  to 
discuss  in this particular  model.  See Marc Jarsulic  (1988) for a 
mathematical  example of such relations. 7 
The model  is Kaleckian  in that emphasis  is placed  on profits 
as the key to saving and investment.  Kalecki generally  assumed  sW 
= 0, which  would  greatly  simplify  our derivations  but would  also 
omit some results which  I think are very significant  and relevant 
to the problem of relations among the classes of income recipients. 
The  key  Kaleckian  elements  in the  model  then  are  the  Kaldorian 
saving function in which s,  > sW,  the positive mark-up on wage costs 
(or "degree  of monopoly"  in Kalecki's  terminology),  and the .role 
of  profits  in  the  investment  function.  In  this  way  Kalecki 
demonstrated a mutual dependence between income distribution  on one 
hand and effective demand and so output and employment on the other 
hand.4 
The investment function requires deeper examination.  The role 
of profits could simply be justified as representing  the incentive 
for  investment  spending.  Here  then  we  should  properly  have 
expected profits, and actual profits would serve as the best proxy. 
Kalecki  (1971  [I9371  I  Chap.  9),  however,  offers  another 
justification  for the influence of profits on investment.  This is 
his  "principle  of  increasing  risk,"  which  holds  that  the 
availability  of finance  for investment  is a function of the level 
of profits, both as a source of finance itself and as an attraction 
for external sources of finance.  The argument is that the marginal 
risk of any particular  investment increases with the percentage  of 
41n this way Kalecki also represents a fusion of "MarxiantU  and 
llKeynesianlt  concerns.  See Kalecki  (1971) for the major pieces  of 
Kalecki's  work on the capitalist  economy. 8 
one's funds sunk.  Therefore,  the more  internally  generated  funds 
there are, the lesser the risk of a particular  size of investment 
and the greater the likelihood that borrowed funds will be repaid.5 
Substituting  equation  (7) into equation  (6) gives us 
(6’)  p1 = p1, + all  - a;D. 
We see that investment  is an increasing  function of total profits 
and a decreasing  function  of interest times  debt.  Of course  the 
idea that  interest has a negative  influence  on investment  as the 
cost of external  funds is not novel here, but the way  in which  it 
enters  into our investment  function is according  to the principle 
of  increasing  risk,  since  its  effect  is  due  to  decreasing  the 
amount  of  total  profits  going  to  enterprise.  This  type  of 
treatment  of interest income moreover  is in the spirit of Keynes's 
concern  for the rentier aspect of capitalism,  which he saw as the 
source of much of capitalism's  problems.  (See Keynes  1964  [1936], 
Chaps. 16 and 24.)  As interest or debt increases,  investment will 
5Kalecki's  proposition  became  controversial  following  the 
publication  of Franc0 Modigliani  and Merton  Miller  (1958), which 
holds that no shareholder  should be concerned about the particular 
mix of debt and equity held by any firm on the grounds  that he or 
she could always ltroll  his [or  her] own  It  leverage by his or her own 
purchases  of the firm's debt or borrowing to purchase more shares. 
A simple counterargument  to this follows, as Modigliani  and Miller 
themselves  admitted,  if bankruptcy  risk  of the  firm  affects  the 
security  of the  firm's debt.  In recent years  argument  having  to 
do with  asymmetric  information  and moral  hazard  have  also  called 
into question the lVModigliani-Miller  theorem."  See Steve Fazzari, 
Glenn  Hubbard,  and  Bruce  Petersen  (1988b,  pp.  146-152)  for  a 
summary  of these  arguments.  In any event,  the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem  does  not obviate  the relevance  of profits  for investment 
as  a  proxy  for  expected  profits  but  only  as  a  limit  on  the 
availability  of finance. 9 
decrease. 
To the extent that investment can be taken to be a good thing 
for society as a whole and at least for wage- and profit-earners, 
the recipients  of rentier  income have an interest opposed  to that 
of the rest of society.  An interesting point related to this which 
follows  from the way  that  our  investment  function  is constructed 
is  that  a  higher  price  level  will  increase  real  investment  by 
lowering  the  burden  of debt  in real terms.  A  paradox,  however, 
which  I will  argue has profound  social  implications,  arises  from 
the fact that, since both wage- and profit-earners  save, both are 
the  recipients  of  the  rentier  income.  Thus  we  have  opposing 
interests  within  each  of  the  working  and  capitalist  classes-- 
perhaps within  the same individual! 
In the spirit of Kalecki and Keynes we do not allow saving to 
represent  fundamentally  anything more than that part of income not 
consumed,  except  for the influence of profits  on the financing  of 
investment.  We say that because there is debt created, savers have 
a claim on part of total profits.  We do not, however,  specify any 
necessary  connection  between  the  flow of saving  and the  level of 
debt.6  Nor do we let the level of saving affect the interest rate. 
In other words, we don't have a loanable funds theory of interest. 
We do allow the actions of rentiers to affect the rate of interest, 
either through their direct decisions to shift funds out of lending 
or  through  their  ability  to  influence  monetary  policy.  This, 
6This may  become  important  in a future dynamic  treatment  of 
the issues discussed  here. 10 
though,  is accordance  with  Keynes's  liquidity  preference  theory, 
in  which  the  level  of  savings  is  not  important  but  rather  the 
availability  of finance by means  of private  or public  actions  is 
what matters.  We have no money demand or money supply function in 
this model  but merely  take the  interest  rate as the resultant  of 
the  actions  of  the  rentiers  in  allocating  their  wealth,  if  not 
offset by monetary  policy. 
We also simply take the level of debt as an historical  datum, 
though of course we could perform comparative  statics exercises on 
the effects  of changes  in the level of debt.  Decisions  about the 
division of profit of enterprise between retention  in the firm and 
distribution  to shareholders  will be taken  to be subsumed  in the 
saving  propensity,  s,.  We  also  ignore  any  consumption  out  of 
capital gains, holding  it to be a second-order  effect compared  to 
the decision  to consume or not out of wages  and profits. 
Comparative  Statics Results 
In  the  Kaleckian  and  Keynesian  visions  of  the  economy  the 
actions  of social classes are rather circumscribed  by competition 
among the individuals and firms composing each class.  To be sure, 
we do not have  lVperfectlV  competition,  at least for Kalecki,  but a 
world  of  oligopoly  and  trade  unionism.  Still,  we  don't  have 
lVperfectVV  collusion,  either.  Differences  between  a  Kaleckian 
picture  of class  struggle  and a I'purer"  Marxian  one on one level 
have merely  to do with greater emphasis  in the Kaleckian  story on 
competition  in the product market v. the labor market.  This comes 
from  the  importance  in  Kalecki's  and  Keynes's  eyes  of  the  wage 11 
bargain  being  in the  first  instance a bargain  over a money  wage, 
not a real wage.  In our model  the  real wage,  w/p,  =  l/$b.  The 
only control Kalecki gives the workers  over w/p  is some influence 
of  trade  union  strength  on $,  due  to  a  limit  on  the  ability  of 
firms to pass along higher wage costs in product  prices  (Kalecki, 
1971, Chaps.  5 and 14). 
A more fundamental  issue, arising from the recognition  of the 
significance  of the level of effective demand on output below full 
employment,  is that  even  if capitalists  could  collude  as a class 
in their dealings with workers, they would not benefit greatly from 
raising $ at the  expense of w/p.  Conversely, even if workers could 
collude  as  a  class  in  their  dealings  with  capitalists,  the 
capitalists would not be greatly harmed by increases  in w/p at the 
expense  of ;I;.  To be sure, there can be a fallacy of composition 
at work here.  That is, any one capitalist will benefit from higher 
mark-ups  and lower wages  in his or her own business  to the extent 
that his or her workers  do not affect the overall  level of demand 
much.  In the aggregate, however, we shall see the small magnitude 
of such an effect. 
In our model  the weapons  of each  class  are not  even  always 
under  their  own  control  and  when  they  are,  they  involve  merely 
incremental changes in 3, w, and 1.  Let us now examine the results 
of such incremental changes in these variables,  which we will call 
our  tVdistributional  variables.1'  First, we  shall  solve  the model 
for the equilibrium  values  of real national  income, Y, real total 
profits, II/p,  real wage income, W/p, real rentier income, R/p, and 12 
real profit  of enterprise,  II,/p. 
(13)  Y= 
(14)  a= 
P 
(15)  W= 
P 
(16)  B= 
P 
310 - acD/tib  I  or  8(1, - alD/p)  . 
(sn  -  a)  (3  -  1)  +  SW  6  -  a)  (3  -  1)  +  SW 
--  - 
e 
-  alD/@wb)  (o - l), or a0  - alD/n)  (3 - 1)  . 
II  -  a)(3 - 1) + s,  (sit  - a)($ - 1) + sw 
-- 
IO - alD/@wb  ,  or  IO  -  alD/p  . 
(%l  -  a)($ - 1) + sw  (sit  - a)($ - 1) + sw 
(17) 
--  - 
IlE  =  150  -  alD/@wb)  (ti  - 1) - a,  or 
-  a)($ - 1) + sw 
-- 
P  (%I  Gwb 
IlO  -  alD/p)  (8 - 1)  -L. 
- a)($ - 1) + sw 
-- 
(%  @wb 
It may  be  useful  to  note  that  the  expression  for  Y  can  be 
reduced to the familiar Keynesian one of I/s, where f = I,  - alD/p, 
or  that  part  of  real  investment  not  a  function  of  II/p,  and  s = 
s,(e) + sw(1 - a), a  =  the share of profits  in national  income.  If 
SW  =  a=O,  IUP = IO/%, which of course is the l'CambridgeV'  equation 
for profits, or Kaleckils "the capitalists get what they  spend, the 
workers  spend what they get," or Keynes's  "widow's cruise"  theory 
of profits in his Treatise on Money  (1971 [1930]).  Adding positive 
saving  out  of  wages  and  an  influence  of  profits  on  investment 
complicates  this basic  structure, but in ways that hopefully  give 
interesting  and important results. 
Now  let's  see what  happens  to  the  levels  of  income  of  the 
economy as a whole and each of the classes of income recipient when changes  occur  in 
of Y with respect 
which  follow. 
13 
$1 w, and 1.  First, taking  partial  derivatives 
to those three variables, we get the expressions 
(18)  e  = &,  - a)  (alD/wb - I 
a#  r  (sn 
oU+.Jo. 
- a)  (3 - I) + sw3 
From inequalities  (10) and  (12), (sn  -  a)(alD/wb  - I,,)  is most 
likely  negative.  The  entire  expression  is  probably  negative, 
though a low s,  or a high sw  or a combination  of the two could make 
the expression  positive.  The economic  reasoning  here  is that  an 
increase in 4 redistributes  income from wage-earners,  a group with 
a high  propensity  to  consume,  to profit-earners,  a group  with  a 
lower  propensity  to  consume.  With  a  given  level  of  investment 
spending,  an increase  in $ thus decreases  effective  demand  and so 
national  income.  If a = 0, this clearly would  happen.  But with 
a > 0, investment is not given.  Redistribution  of this type lowers 
consumption  but increases  investment.  Indeed,  if a were  > s,  but 
not  so  great  as  to  make  (alD/wb  -  I,,)  >  0,  aY/a$  would  be 
unambiguously  positive.  The spirit of the Kaleckian and Keynesian 





g=  -aD/wb  . 
ah  (sn  - a)(3 - 1) + s, 
expression  is clearly negative, as is surely no mystery, 
influence of higher I on investment  is negative. 
ay=  alD/?b  . 
aw  (sn  - a)($ - 1) + sw 14 
Here we see that an increase in the money wage equally passed 
along in the price  level increases national  income.  Inflation  is 
expansionary  in this model because of its lightening of the burden 
of debt.  Why don't creditors, who obviously suffer from inflation, 
demand  higher  interest,  at  least when  inflation  is anticipated? 
Well,  perhaps  they  do, but we  leave that  to  a discussion  of the 
ability of rentiers to influence I in their  favor. 
. 
\  . 
When  we  turn  to  the  effect  of  our  three  distributional 
variables  on real wage  income, we get the following  results. 
-- 
(21)  a;$/~) = I_sn  - a)(2alD/@wb_-  I,)  + alD/&'wb(s,+a. 
[ (%I  -  a)  MJ -  1)  +  SW1 
As with aY/a$, this result is ambiguous.  Again, a combination 
of a low value  for s,,  a high value for s,,  and a high, but not too 
high, value  for a could make the expression  positive.  It is more 
likely than  it is for aY/a&  however,  that  a(W/p)/a$  is negative 
because here we have the direct negative  effect of a higher mark- 
up  on the  real wage  as well  as the  effect  on employment  through 




=  a  (W/P)  -aD/@wb  . 
al  (SII  -  a)($ - 1) + sw 
(23)  =  a  (W/P)  alD/&'b  . 
aii  (%I  -  a)($ - 1) + sw 
These  two  expressions  clearly  are  respectively  negative  and 15 
positive,  and  the  economic  reasoning  behind  these  results  is 
identical to that  in the cases of aY/al and aY/aw. 
To  examine  the  effects  of  our  distributional  variables  on 
rentier  income, we need to say something more about the matter  of 
capital gains.  We have defined rentier income to be fixed-interest 
income  plus  capital  gains  on  fixed-interest  securities.  Since, 
however, we have taken the interest rate on these securities  to be 
exogenous  in our  model,  when  would  capital  gains  occur?‘>\  If we 
divide  the  interest  rate  into a short-term  and a long-term  rate, 
and take the  short-term  rate to be determined  by monetary  policy 
and the long-term rate to be affected by policy but also by actions 
of borrowers  and lenders  in response to expectations  about  future 
movements  in rates,  concern  for default  risk, and the  like, then 
we have  a way  for capital  gains  to occur  even  if the  short-term 
rate remains  unchanged.  Of course,  this  also goes  a way  towards 
making  our variable  y endogenous.  I will  leave  this  for  future 
work and get around it in this paper by assuming I to be the short- 
term rate. 
Capital gains  (and losses) of course are merely a revaluation 
of, in this case, financial wealth.  They are not part of national 
income because they are just this revaluation  of claims and do not 
represent  any  production  of  goods  and  services.  We  have  not 
allowed them to affect demand for goods and services, since we are 
ignoring  any  consumption  out  of capital  gains  and  any  effect  of 
their  providing  finance  for investment  spending.  Capital  gains, 
however,  of  course  are  important  components  of  rentier  income. 16 
Thus  we  do  need  to  see how  they  are  affected  by  changes  in our 
distributional  variables  as  we  take  the  comparative  statics 
derivatives  for rentier  income, which  follow. 
(24)  a(R/o) = -  ;D  + $(aG/a&  - G_ 
a*  m 
-- 
@'wb 
The negative  effect  on rentier  income  from an  increase  in 3 
is due  to the decrease  in real terms  of a given  amount ,of  money 
income with a higher price level.  Thus we have the negative  signs 
on the levels of interest  income and capital gains.  The level of 
capital gains and the derivative aG/a$, the change in capital gains 
as  the  mark-up  changes,  of  course  could  themselves  be  either 
positive  or  negative  quantities--in  other  words,  we  could  have 
capital  losses.  Since we know that a rise in 3 probably  causes a 
fall in Y and we will see that it should also cause a rise in II/p, 
both the level of and change  in capital gains should be positive. 
This  is  because  a  fall  in  Y  should  be  associated  with  an 
expectation  of a fall in I and so perhaps  in long-term  rates  and 
an  increase  in II/P  may  also  cause  long-rates  to  fall because  of 
lower  default  risk.  The  overall  value  of  a(R/p)/a$  should  be 
negative  unless the capital gain is large enough so that 3(aG/a$) 
> ;D + G. 
(25) 
This  expression  is clearly  positive  unless  there  is a large 
capital  loss following the rise in 1. 17 
Since we have argued that an increase in W, other things being 
equal,  is  expansionary,  it  is  likely  that  aG/aw  and  G  will  be 
negative.  The effect of a higher price level on G, here the level 
of the loss, will diminish the overall effect, but it is clear that 
the overall  effect will be negative.  \ 
Finally,  let's  examine  the  effects  of  changes  in  our 
distributional  variables  on real profit  of enterprise. 
(27)  2-f&..= 
a@ 
-- 
%fLl  - alD/@wb) +  (alD/;j;'wb)  (3 - 1)  rts,  -  a)  (8 - 1) + s,l + 
[  (srl  - a)  (3 - 1) + SW1 
2 
This expression clearly is positive, as would be expected, but 
note that if sW  = 0, the expression would become  alD/&b  +  lD 
s, - a  m' 
so that  the only  increase  in IIJp from an  increase  in 5 would  be 
due to the effects of the lowered burden of debt on investment and 
the lowered  level of rentier  income as a share of total profits. 
This  is because  even though  an increase  in the mark-up  increases 
profits per unit of sales, by raising p relative to w it also cuts 
the volume  of sales.  If wage-earners  spend all their  income, the 
increase  in margins  and  decrease  in volume  exactly  cancel  out. 
Apart  from the  effects  of higher  prices  on debt  and  the  rentier 18 
share of profits  then, the only reason that raising mark-ups  does 
profit-earners  any  good  is,  paradoxically,  because  of  workers' 
saving. 
(28)  - 1.  a(IIIr/n)  = -  (aD/$Fb)  (3 - 1) 
aL  (%I - a)($ - 1) + sW 
-- 
Qwb 
(29)  i?l_wFd  = 
--2  alD/ajwb(s - 1)  +  ;D  . 
aii  (%I - a)($ - 1) + sW  $i2b 
. 
These  expressions  are  obviously  negative  and  p'ositive 
respectively.  That higher  interest hurts profit  of enterprise  is 
not surprising.  That higher  money wages  increase  profits  may be 
surprising,  but here  the higher w  is being  fully passed  along  in 
prices,  and  it is the  effects  of higher  prices  on the burden  of 
debt and on the share of rentier  income in total profits  that are 
raising profit  of enterprise. 
The  last  comparative  statics  exercise  we  want  to  perform 
involves redistributivetaxation.  VNKeynesianll  employment expansion 
policy we can examine with what we already have.  Monetary  policy 
is simply changing  1.  Fiscal policy,  or at least a change  in the 
level  of  the  government  budget  deficit  by  changing  government 
spending,  would be identical to a change  in I,,. A redistributive 
tax, however,  adds a few complications.  First, we need to alter 




l-I*  =  (1 - E)rI,. 








w  =  WL + El-I,. 
L = bY. 
p1 = snn*  + S"W. 
p = $wb. 
p1 = p1, + an,. 
III,  = I-II,  - ;D. 
R = ;D + G. 
. 
We are taxing  total profits  at the tax rate, E  (0 -C  E < l), 
7 
and simply  giving  the proceeds  to wage-earners.'  Thus we have  a 
new equation,  (30)  I  which  specifies  the relation  between  before- 
tax  profits,  lIB,  and  after-tax  profits,  III,.  This  in  turn 
necessitates  altering  equations  (l), (2), (4), and  (7), which  are 
accordingly  marked by ""'. 
This need not be the only tax we analyze, but it is the most 
interesting one at this point in the paper.  Taxing wage income for 
redistribution  within  the  wage-earning  class  would  not  be  very 
interesting  (See Kalecki,  1971  [1937],  pp.  37-38.),  and  taxing 
wages for redistribution to profit-earners  could be analyzed simply 
by making E < 0.  A tax  on interest income and capital gains would 
be  relevant  to  our  concerns,  but  its  implications  are  so 
straightforward  that we will leave discussion  of it until we take 
up policy  recommendations  near the end of the paper. 
What is the effect of changes in E on national  income and the 
7The redistribution  of course need not be in the form of cash 
payments.  It could easily represent  social benefits  like medical 
or housing  payments  or relief  for the unemployed. 20 
incomes of each of our three classes? 
(31)  ay= 
at 
ml  - alD/wb)([(l  -  t)(s,  -  a) + s,E]($ - 1) + s,(l + E) - 
(1 + t)  [ (a  -  s,  +  ~“1 (3  -  1)  +  +I  > 
. 
([(I  -  E)  (sn  -  a) + s,E]($ - 1) + s,(l + E))2 
Not  surprisingly,  the  results  here  turn  out  to  be  rather 
similar to those obtained when considering the effects of a change 
in 3.  From  inequalities  (10) and  (12) the  expression  should  be 
positive.  If, however,  sw and  a were  large  enough  and  s, small 
enough, the expression  could conceivably  become negative. 
The profits tax under our assumptions has no effect on rentier 
income.  As regards wage income, taking the derivative,  a(W/p)/aE, 
results  in  a  very  complicated  expression,  which,  however,  is 
roughly  positive  under  the same conditions  as aY/at  is positive. 
With profit of enterprise,  a(ll,/p)/at  also gives a very complicated 
expression,  which  is roughly  negative  under  the  conditions  when 
these other derivatives are positive.  These results are surely not 
surprising,  but  what  is  interesting  to  note  is  that  if  sw =  0, 
aY/aE  and  a(W/p)/at  become  unambiguously  positive  and  a(rLJp)/aE 
becomes zero.  This is a well-known result of Kalecki  (1971 [1937], 
Chap. 4), but we will place some importance upon the changes in the 
result brought  about by sw > 0 later. 21 
The  Structure  of  Class  Conflict 
Let us  now go  over  the  implications  of  changes  in our  four 
distributional  variables  for class conflict.  Increases  in $ help 
profit-earners  some  and  hurt  wage-earners  and  rentiers.  They 
probably  decrease  Y and contribute  to  inflation  (ap).  Increases 
in I help rentiers, though there may be an associated  capital loss 
for  them.  They  hurt  wage-earners  and  profit-earners,  and  they 
decrease  Y.  Increases  in ti  help wage-earners  and profitLearners 
some, while hurting rentiers.  They increase Y some and contribute 
to inflation.  Increases  in w that cut equally  into 3 help wage- 
earners and are neutral to rentiers.  They hurt profit-earners  some 
and increase Y.  Increases  in E have similar effects to increases 
in w that cut equally  into $.  Remember,  if sw  and a are large and 
sn is small, the effects of ~33  and CUE  on some of the variables  can 
be reversed. 
The normal  results  of our comparative  statics  exercises  are 
summarized  in the table below.  We add to the list results  of the 
effects of changes in the distributional  variables  on p, which can 
be  immediately  drawn  from  equation  (5).  We  also  add  a  new 
lldistributionall'  variable,  aI,,,  which  can be used to give results 
for  a  change  in  government  deficit  spending  as  well  as  in 
autonomous  investment  spending,  since  these  results  should  be 
identical.  The  results  again  are  immediately  apparent  from 
inspection  of equations  (5), (13),  (15),  (16),  and  (17). 22 
ay  ap  a  (W/P)  a  (Q/P)  a  (R/P) 
a3  +  + 
- 
aL  0  + 
aG  +  +  +  + 
aii  = -a$  +  0  +  0 
aE  +  0  +  0 
aI0  +  0  +  +  0 
. 
This summarizes the gains and losses to society as a whole and 
to  each  class  of  income  recipients  from  changes  in  the 
distributional  variables.  To  what  extent,  however,  in  the 
Kaleckian-Keynesian  framework  is any class  able  to exert  control 
over a particular  variable  and engage  in strategic  behavior?  For 
Kalecki  (1971 [1943], Chap. 5) the main determinants  of 3 were the 
level  of  concentration  of  industry,  the  degree  of  non-price 
competition, the level of overhead costs, and the strength of trade 
unions.  The  first two of these are matters  of competition  among 
firms,  and  the  third  is  largely,  even  if  not  purely,  a 
technological  determinant.  These  would  leave  little  room  for 
strategic behavior on the part of profit-earners  as a whole against 
other  groups.  A  high  level  of  concentration  may  give  profit- 
earners a freer hand to change 3 strategically, though this is more 
likely  to be  on an  industry  rather  than  economy-wide  level.  My 
feeling  is that  in a Kaleckian  framework most  of the  inter-class 
action  over  5  should  occur  in the  conflict  between  workers  and 
firms over W.  Kalecki  (1971, Chap. 14) attributes  the ability  of 23 
unions  to  eat  into 3  to  result  from the  fact  that  there  is some 
limit to the ability  of firms to pass  along  increased  money  wages 
in higher  prices. 
Where  does this  limit come  from?  If we were  talking  about  a 
national  economy  in an interdependent  world  economy,  we could  say 
from foreign competition.  Even in a closed economy, though,  we see 
that  the  rentier  class  will  be  the  ones  most  directly  hurt  by  a 
wage-price  spiral.  Of course  inflation  is not costless  to anyone 
\ 
in terms  of its adding  inconvenience  to calculation  and planning, 
its damage to the liquidity property of money, and its interference 
with the relative  price mechanism.  What weapons  does  the rentier 
class  have  at  its disposal?  Monetary  policy  determines  at  least 
the  short-term  interest  rate.  To  some  extent  rentiers  are 
dependent  upon  enlisting  political  support  in the central  bank  to 
help them  out, but they can shift their  funds  into real  assets  or 
abroad.  This  of  course  also  worsens  the  inflation,  though 
protecting  them from it somewhat, by raising the prices of housing, 
etc.,  and putting  downward  pressure  on the  foreign  exchange  rate 
of  the  domestic  currency.  This  then  can  in turn  help  them  gain 
support  to  the  extent  that  others  also  dislike  the  costs  of 
inflation. 
What  about the behavior  of the wage-earners  towards  w and t? 
The  interests  of profit-earners  and rentiers  are 
. 
opposed  to those 
of  every  other  group  and  society  as  a  whole.  Wage-earners' 
interests,  however,  coincide  with  that  of  society  as  a whole  at 
least  with  respect  to  effects  on  national  income  and  always 24 
coincide  with  one  of the  other  two  classes.  Profit-earners  and 
rentiers  should always run into a fight from the rest of society. 
Can wage-earners  avoid this? 
Remember  now who the rentiers  are  in our model.  We created 
a separate category of rentier income as a share of total profits, 
but we don't  have  a separate  class  of rentier  individuals.  Thus 
profit-earners  and wage-earners  receive  the  rentier  income,  and, 
as remarked  above,  the struggles  between  income  recipients  occur 
within  each class and within  some of the same individuals.  These 
people  can say with Walt Kelly, as he wrote  in the old Poso comic 
strip,  "We have met the enemy, and he is us!" 
Remember  also that  it is the existence  of s, > 0 that  gives 
wage-earners  rentier income and perhaps profit of enterprise income 
as well.  Positive sw  is also the major cause of a(rI,/p)/a$  > 0 and 
a&/p)/&  < 0.  And, the higher sw  is, the more likely it is, other 
things  being  equal,  that  aY/a$  and  a(W/p)/a$  >  0  and  aY/aE  and 
a(w/p)/aE  < 0.  Positive  sw  gives wage-earners  "more to lose than 
their chains!" 
Demonstrating  a narrow economic interest that might be helped 
by  advocating  certain  policies,  however,  may  not  be  nearly  as 
important  as  revealing  the  susceptibility  to  an  ideological 
commitment  to these policies  that transcends  narrow  self-interest 
but  rather  presents  itself as encompassing  the general  interest. 
If  we  were  just  discussing  strategic  action  by  a  group  of 
individuals engaged in bargaining  over the size of their paycheck, 
narrow and direct  self-interest  might be sufficient.  When we are 25 
talking about the  need to influence the political process, however, 
some appeal to the general  interest at least must be made.8 
Earlier in this century Nikolai Bukharin  (1972 [1919]) argued 
that marginalist  economics was "the economic theory of the leisure 
class.11  He  held  that  the  emergence  of  a  large  group  who  were 
divorced  from  direct  interaction  with  the  production  process, 
living  as  rentiers  and  so  concerned  solely  with  purchasing 
consumption  goods,  explained  the creation  of the margina~~utility 
theory.  While  this  has  perhaps  received  some  unwitting  support 
from Piero Sraffa's  (1960, pp. 7-9) demonstration  that in a model 
of the production  of commodities  by means of commodities  only the 
prices of UUnon-basics,1V  or l~luxuryl~  goods, which do not enter into 
the reproduction  of goods other than themselves,  can be explained 
by supply  and demand,  in its purest  form it may be too extreme  a 
claim.  It may be, however, that the Weltanschauunq  of the rentier 
mentality  does  include the idea that wage and price  inflation  are 
an  unwanted  interference  with  the  economic  system  and  that 
therefore  high  interest  rate  and  other  austerity  policies  are 
warranted  to stop  inflation,  apart  from any narrow  economic  gain 
to the advocates  of such policies. 
An important matter to note about anti-inflationary  policies 
is how they work in this model.  As we have seen, ap/al and ap/aI, 
(below full employment)  = 0.  Raising  y in the  first  instance  is 
not a means  to lower p but just to raise R to fight back  against 
'A concise  discussion  of this point  is found in David Levine 
(1988, pp. l-4). 26 
rising  p.  It  works  to  lower  p,  just  as  lowering  I,,  does,  by 
lowering  aggregate  demand,  which  above  full  employment  lowers  p 
generally  and at or below full employment lowers primary commodity 
prices,  which  we  have  not  included  in  the  model  and  which  in 
Kalecki's  (1971,  pp.  43-44)  terms  are  t'demand-determined,"  as 
opposed to finished goods prices, which are VVcost-determined.1V  The 
fall  in primary  commodity  prices  then  feeds  into  finished  goods 
prices  by lowering  materials  costs  and perhaps  by lowering  E, as 
wage-earners  feel both less need to cover rising prices with wage 
increases  and  less  ability  to gain  higher  wages  with  increasing 
unemployment  and so competition  for jobs.  9 
With the element of capital gains in rentier income of course 
the rentiers like hiqh and fallinq interest rates even better than 
hiqh  and  risinq  rates.  This  makes  their  opposition  to  the 
interests  of  the  rest  of  society  even  more  patent,  since  the 
scenario  of high  and  falling rates  is most  likely to be found  in 
recessions. 
I  don't  want  to  overslight  the  true  inconvenience  and 
uncertainty that inflation adds to the economic system, but without 
some explanation  for the desirability  of anti-inflation  policy  to 
economic  and  ideological  interests,  I  feel  it would  be  hard  to 
'Wilfred  Beckerman  and  Tim  Jenkinson  (1986)  demonstrate 
statistically  that  most  of  the  deceleration  in  inflation  in the 
OECD countries  between  1980 and  1982 can be attributed  to a fall 
in primary  commodity  prices  rather  than  unemployment.  Remember 
that  in  our  model  aw  does  not  affect  the  level  of  employment 
negatively but positively,  as the only real balance effect we have 
works in reverse of the traditional argument by lowering the burden 
of debt. 27 
explain the apparent willingness  in the body politic to put up with 
the costs  of these programs.  The  interesting  thing  that  I think 
our model brings out  that  transcends even Kalecki and Keynes is the 
importance  of  the  conflict  between  debtors  and  creditors.  The 
beneficial  effects  of  inflation  and  the  high  costs  of  anti- 
inflation  policies  come  out  very  clearly  in  this  model.1'  The 
predisposition  of a "Keynesian"  system  to  inflation,  foreseen  by 
Joan Robinson  (1937), is also clearly brought  out, since &e.only 
existence  of  any  negative  trade-off  between  money  wages  and 
employment  comes  from the actions  supported  by the  rentier  point 
of view. 
Kalecki  (1971  [1943],  Chap.  12)  thought  that  the  class 
conflicts  in  a  tVKeynesian" world  would  work  themselves  out 
cyclically,  according  to his  well-known  theory  of  the  political 
business  cycle.  The interesting  idea from that which  is relevant 
to  this  paper  is  a  notion  that  the  profit-earners  would  switch 
sides  with  the  cycle,  allying  with  the wage-earners  in  favor  of 
stimulation  in the  down  phase  and  joining  with  the  rentiers  in 
favor  of  austerity  as  full  employment  approached.  This  was 
because, though profit-earners  benefit from high aggregate demand, 
full employment  could lead to a breakdown  in labor discipline,  as 
workers  had  perhaps 
this, however,  means 
little  to  fear  from  being  fired.  Fighting 
that profit-earners  have to hurt themselves. 
Certainly there is a qualitative change once we hit full employment 
"These  effects of inflation and of anti-inflation  policy have 
also been emphasized  recently by William  Greider  (1987). 28 
because from there on no more expansion in real output is possible. 
Whether at this  point profit-earners  are willing to hurt  themselves 
in order to discipline  labor is another question.  If they  feel a 
threat to ;i;,  they may find accepting  lower demand desirable. 
Kalecki's  story brings  out clearly  of course  the problem  of 
using  increases in I,  through government  deficit spending.  On the 
face of it this would seem to be the optimal policy vehicle,  since 
an  increase  in I, increases  national  income  and helps  both\  wage- 
and profit-earners.  But this is only true below  full employment. 
Once  we  have  reached  full employment  of course  all  the  stimulus 
does  is to raise prices,  hurting  rentiers and whichever  wage-  and 
profit-earners  can't keep up with the inflation. 
Policy  Recommendations 
The main policy recommendation which has historically  emerged 
from this school of thought has been that of the "incomes policy.lV 
The utility  of such a policy  is straightforward  in our model.  If 
society could construct  an agreement  to link money wage  increases 
to increases in labor productivity  and to restrain the ability and 
so desirability  of wage-  and profit-earners  to struggle  with  one 
another in ways that set off a wage-price  spiral, we could perhaps 
keep them from setting off the kind of anti-inflation  policy that 
hurts  them.  Practically,  achieving  such an agreement  outside  of 
wartime  price controls has seemingly been impossible. 
Another  way to go then might be instead of keeping wage- and 
profit-earners  from hurting themselves by stirring up the rentiers 
rather  to keep  the  rentiers  from having  cause  to be  stirred  up. 29 
That  is,  institute  what  has  now  come  to  be  called  a  system  of 
I'Islamic  banking,"  following the injunctions  in the Koran and the 
Bible which prohibit  the  taking of interest."  Instead, returns on 
loans would be contracted to be a share of the profits.  Of course 
all along through this paper, the reader may have wondered why the 
rentiers  didn't  invest  in  business  equity  if  concerned  about 
inflation,  anyway.  And,  the usual  answer has been  that business 
equity has proved  to be a poor  inflation  hedge.  There  h&e.been 
a number  of  stories  advanced  attempting 
most recent explanation  comes  from David 
(I989), who attribute the troubles of the 
to  explain  this.12  The 
Ely and Kenneth  Robinson 
stock market as inflation 
gets  stronger  to  anticipation  of  the  effect  of  anti-inflation 
policy on profits.  So, again the enemy is self-created.  However, 
it still may not be possible  to get a social  agreement  on giving 
up  interest  in  favor  of  profit-shares  due  to  the  extra  risk 
naturally  inherent  in profits  returns  even  if they became  a good 
inflation hedge.  13 
"This  would  also  serve  as  a  device  to  keep  "the  rate  of 
interest" automatically  from exceeding "the marginal efficiency of 
capital," which is why Keynes  (1964 [1936], Chap. 23) praised such 
things as usury  laws and "stamped money."  Pervez Tahir  (1980, p. 
2) notes that  "Keynes is frequently quoted as an authority  in the 
recent attempts  in the Islamic world to establish  a zero interest 
rate order." 
12See Burton Malkiel  (1985, pp. 294-306) for a summary of the 
major proffered  explanations. 
"While  encouraging  rentiers  to  participate  in  a  "share 
economy,"  like the proposal  of Martin  Weitzman  (1984), our model 
does  not  encourage  such  for wage-earners.  This  is because  the 
share economy scheme makes real wages fall in a downturn, and since 
in our model  the propensity  to spend out of wages  is higher  than 
the propensity  to spend out of profits under such conditions,  this 30 
The more modest proposal of a "cash-flow tax," which would tax 
corporate profits minus investment spending, would enable firms to 
finance more  of their  investment  from internally-generated  funds 
and encourage  them to do so and thus 
which  gives  rentier  interests  their 
society.  14  And,  finally, just taxing 
gains  on  interest-bearing  securities 
forms of income would serve wage- and, 
decrease  the  level of debt, 
leverage  over  the  rest  of 
interest  income and capital 
at a higher  rate  than  other 
profit-earners  with ‘a,\way  to 
recoup some of the costs of feeding the rentier  interests. 
Conclusions 
As  opposed  to models  of class  conflict  wherein  the  conflict 
is between wages and profits,  this paper has presented  a model  of 
class conflict  based  on the  ideas of Kalecki  and Keynes  in which 
wages and profits are not strongly inversely related.  The conflict 
then becomes among wage-earners,  profit-earners,  and rentiers.  To 
some  extent  we  end up with  much  the  same  conclusions  as  Kalecki 
(1971 [1943], Chap.  12) did about the political  business  cycle  in 
which  there  is  a  cyclical  tradeoff  between  unemployment  and 
inflation  and  profit-earners  switch  from  supporting  fighting 
unemployment  in  the  slump  to  help  profits  and  to  supporting 
creating unemployment  in the boom in sympathy with the rentiers to 
help  maintain  labor  discipline.  We  do,  though,  bring  out  the 
importance  of Keynes's  idea that the  functionless  rentier  is the 
would exacerbate  the slump. 
14See Fazzari, Hubbard,  and Petersen  (1988a) for a discussion 
of tax considerations when firms favor the use of internal finance. 31 
major anti-social  element in the capitalist economy for explaining 
the embracing  of anti-inflation  policies  with their severe  social 
costs.  And, we extend Kalecki's and Keynes's analysis to show that 
the major class conflict is between debtors and creditors  and that 
it  is the  existence  of  creditor-rentiers  among  the  wage-earning 
class  that  leads  to  the  schizophrenia  of  the  modern  "Keynesian" 
economy, with  its Vtstop-go't  or political  cycle pattern. 
The  Keynesian-populist  ideology  of  low  interest “rates, 
inflation,  and  the  evils  of the  rentier  aspect  of capitalism  is 
reminiscent  of David Ricardo's attack on the landlord class in his 
debate  with  Thomas  Malthus  on the  Corn  Laws.  (See, e.g.,  George 
Zinke,  1967,  pp.  29-77.)  Just  as  in Ricardo's  view  high  rents 
redistributed  income to the spendthrift landlords from the thrifty, 
but reinvesting  in economic growth, capitalists,  in our Kaleckian- 
Keynesian  model  high  interest  redistributes  income  to  the 
functionless  rentiers  from  the  demand-creating  and  demand- 
fulfilling  wage-  and  profit-earning  classes.  Malthus's  allies 
today then would be the monetarists  and new classicals  who preach 
that fighting  inflation should be our number one priority." 
The argument  that monetarism  is the  ideology  of the  rentier 
has been made by Amit  Bhaduri  and Josef  Steindl  (1985).  Steindl 
(1982) has  also  discussed  the  problem  of  the  rise  in household 
saving  in the OECD countries  in the years of post-war  prosperity. 
15This is certainly a switch on Keynes, who considered himself 
because  of Malthus's  concern  for effective  demand  problems  to be 
allied with Malthus  against Ricardo! 32 
The  problem  Steindl  mentions  there  is the  old  Keynesian  one  of 
insufficient  demand absorption.  If we add to this the problem we 
have  identified  here  of  the  rentier  support  for  demand-killing 
policy, we now have two reasons why saving is bad in a lUKeynesiantl 
conception.  This  is the  fundamental  economic  problem  of postwar 
Keynesian liberal 
the conservatism 
democracy--prosperity  destroys itself by breeding 
which kills  it. 
. 33 
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